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Abstract  
A decarbonization of the energy sector calls for large new investments in renewable energy 
production, and several countries stimulate renewable energy production through economic 
instruments, such as feed-in premiums or other kinds of subsidies. When choosing the 
location for increased production capacity, the producer has typically limited incentives to 
take fully into account the investments costs of the subsequent need for increased grid 
capacity. This may lead to inefficient choices of location. We explore analytically the design 
of feed-in premiums that secure an optimal coordinated development of the entire electricity 
system. We show that with binding electricity transmission constraints, feed-in premiums 
should differ across locations. By the use of a numerical energy system model (TIMES), we 
investigate the potential welfare cost of a non-coordinated development of grids and wind 
power production capacity in the Norwegian energy system. Our result indicates that grid 
investment costs can be substantially higher when the location decision is based on uniform 
feed-in premiums compared with geographically differentiated premiums However, the 
difference in the sum of grid investment cost and production cost is much more modest, as 
location based on uniform feed-in premiums leads to capacity increase in areas with better 
wind conditions.  
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A starting point for our analysis is that increased renewable energy production is one 
important pillar for reaching a low-carbon society. Increased renewable electricity production 
demands investments in grid infrastructure, especially because sources for renewable energy, 
like wind power and hydro power, may be located far from consumer sites. The necessary 
investment in infrastructure does not only depend on the amount of new production capacity, 
but also on the geographical location of this capacity. Within a market based system it is to a 
large extent up to the electricity producers to determine which generation projects they 
believe may be profitable. The regulatory authorities typically decide whether to grant a 
license for a specific project, but they have a limited role in determining which areas market 
participants choose to locate their projects. In this paper we analyze analytically the 
conditions for an optimal geographical distribution of renewable production capacity, and we 
discuss how this can be implemented in a market economy with a support scheme for 
renewable energy production. Furthermore, we conduct a numerical analysis of the 
Norwegian energy system to illustrate the social cost of ignoring the investments in the grid 
infrastructure when designing policy instruments to induce more renewable energy 
production.  
Several countries have specific targets for renewable energy production, including all EU 
Member States (EU, 2009). The European Union seeks to establish an Energy Union with an 
ambitious climate policy and an integrated EU electricity market open to cross-border trade.1 
Moreover, environmental acts such as the Renewables Directive 2009/28/EC are of large 
                                                 
1 Legislation at both primary Treaty level (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) and 
secondary legislation level are key instruments to achieve these goals. This EU energy acquis is also, as a point 
of departure, EEA (European Economic Area) relevant, and is or will become part of the EEA Agreement. The 
energy specific secondary legislation includes a comprehensive set of substantive and institutional requirements 
aimed at promoting a sustainable, secure and competitive EU Internal Electricity Market. These provisions are 
included, inter alia, in the Third Energy Package comprising (for electricity) the Electricity Directive 
2009/72/EC, the Electricity Regulation (EC) No. 714/2009 and the Regulation (EC) No. 713/2009 establishing 
the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER).  
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significance for the electricity market, requiring new renewables investments through the 
setting of binding national renewables targets. However, the choice of instruments to achieve 
the binding national targets have not been harmonised at EU level. Moreover, EU law does 
not at present include harmonised rules for the setting of connection tariffs for new electricity 
generation plants. Member States are therefore free to choose different kinds of renewables 
incentives – such as feed-in premiums, green certificates, tax-   or tariff schemes – provided 
the schemes are designed in accordance with the more general EU legislation. The designated 
policy instrument varies across countries, see, among others, Kitzing et al. (2012).  
Furthermore, according to Kitzing et al. (2012), the support for new renewable energy 
production among EU member states is, in general, not site specific (but does vary across 
technologies and size). Capacity location may matter significantly for the social cost of the 
transformation of the energy sector. Location matters for both emission reductions, impact on 
landscape and transmission congestions, see Hitaj (2015) and Zografos and Martinez-Alier 
(2009). In this paper we concentrate attention on the impact on grid costs. A radical increase 
in renewable energy production may demand substantial investments in increased 
transmission and distribution capacity. Whether the market system leads to a socially efficient 
geographical distribution of production capacity depends inter alia on the design of grid 
connection charges. The literature distinguishes between so-called deep and shallow 
connection charges, see, i.e., Turvey (2006). Deep connection charges reflect all of the 
estimated cost of accommodating additional generation. With shallow connection charges the 
producers only pay for the local investment required to connect capacity to the grid, and not 
the incremental investment that has to be made in the wider transportation system. Shallow 
connection charges lead to inefficient location. Although deep connection charges can ensure 
optimal location of energy production capacity, it raises new question concerning how the 
cost of reinforcement of the wider energy system is to be shared among new and existing 
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users. This is especially relevant for lumpy connection investments; see discussion in Turvey 
(2006). Although the discussion on shallow versus deep connection charges is not new, the 
problem of inefficient location may become increasingly severe due to the greening of the 
energy sector and the subsequent need for grid enforcements.  
In the next section, we present an analytical model to derive the conditions for an optimal 
geographical distribution of new renewable energy production, taking into account the 
warranted grid investments. The model is very simple, but rich enough to capture some of the 
main characteristics of an electricity market with price zones (bidding areas).2  We show how 
a market-based solution with shallow connection charges and uniform feed-in premiums 
(subsidies) to green energy production leads to socially inefficient location and grid 
investments. Furthermore, we show how differentiated (non-uniform) feed-in premiums can 
yield socially optimal location.  
Several authors have analyzed the effect of different renewable subsides schemes on spatial 
distribution of wind power (Grothe and Müsgens, 2013; Schmidt et al., 2013; Hitaj et al., 
2014; Pechan, 2017), but none of these studies analyze the impact on grid investment costs. 
Grimm et al. (2016) studies how private suboptimal locational decisions for generation 
capacity may imply excessive network expansion.  However, they do not derive how an 
optimal design of subsidies alleviates the inefficiencies. 
We restrict our analysis to the potential inefficiency following from the geographical 
distribution of new production capacity, ignoring any potential inefficiencies following from 
the behavior of the regulated grid owners; see discussion in Brunekreeft (2004). For analyses 
of merchant transmission investment as an alternative to investment by regulated transmission 
                                                 
2 Zonal pricing has a uniform market price inside a price zone and is adopted by most European countries. See  
Bjørndal and Jørnsten (2001) for a critical analysis of zonal pricing. 
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system operators, see, i.e., Chao and Peck (1996), Bushnell and Stoft (1997) and Joskow and 
Tirole (2005).   
In Section 3 we present results from a numerical model for the Norwegian energy system to 
illustrate the potential social cost of a socially non-optimal location of wind power capacities. 
Our starting point for the numerical exercise is a political goal to increase the production of 
wind power (a renewable target). We compare the outcome of market based incentive system 
with uniform feed-in premiums (subsidies) with a first-best outcome, that is, a geographical 
distribution of wind production capacities that minimizes the energy system cost (given the 
renewable target). Our result indicate that the total energy system cost of a 5 TWh increase in 
wind power production following from uniform feed in premiums was modestly (6%) more 
costly than a first-best outcome. However, the location of capacities deviates substantially 
between the two regimes, leading to around 50 % higher grid investment costs under a 
market-based incentive mechanism with uniform feed-in premiums compared with the 
socially optimal distribution.   
 
2 Analytical model  
The purpose of the analytical model is to highlight some important characteristics of an 
optimal spatial distribution of wind power, and show how feed-in premiums can be designed 
to achieve that solution in a competitive electricity market. We therefore have constructed an 
analytical model which is very simple, but still rich enough to capture some of the main 
characteristics of an electricity market with price zones. For the sake of simplicity, we make 
several assumptions. All of them are presented successively below, and the implications of the 
simplifying assumptions are briefly discussed in section 2.4. The assumptions are also listed 
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in Table 2. From the model, we derive some general qualitative results, which, due to their 
generality, will also hold for more sophisticated models. In section 3.2, we present our 
numerical model which has a detailed description of the entire energy system, and without the 
simplifying assumption made in the analytical model. We use this model to derive 
quantitative results regarding the social cost of an inefficient geographical distribution wind 
power in Norway.  
 We consider a simple electric power network with two price zones, A and B. There are three 
production nodes and two consumption nodes, as shown in Figure 1. Nodes 1, 2 and 3 are 
potential supply nodes for new wind parks, whereas nodes 4 and 5 are consumption nodes.   A 
notation list is provided in Table 1.  
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New physical power flow capacity (MW) between nodes i and  j (price zones A 
and B). 
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Utility functions. Benefit from consuming electricity (MW) in prize zone k 
W Social welfare 
i
F  Feed-in premium for renewables (per unit MW) at production node i. 
G
  TSO’s profit  
k
p  
Energy price (per unit MW) in zone k. 
 
Table 2. List of assumptions  
• Profit maximizing price taking producers and utility maximizing consumers 
• TSO invests in new transmission capacities whenever that is profitable 
• Cost functions of wind power capacity are increasing and non-concave. 
• It is less costly to install capacity at node 1 than at node 2 for all levels of capacity. 
• The flow on the high voltage transmission capacity between price zone A and B goes 
in the direction from B to A.  
• The physical transmission constraints between node 1 and 4 and 2 and 4 will always 
be nonbinding. 
• New transmission capacities are divisible investment project with continuous 
increasing cost functions.  








q , 2q and 3q  denote the wind production capacity installed, measured in MWs, at nodes 1, 
2 and 3, respectively. The locations differ regarding investment cost. Let 
1 1
( )c q and 
2 2
( )c q  
and 
3 3
( )c q denote the cost functions, which are all assumed to be increasing and non-concave; 
in particular, ( )
i i
c q >0 and ( ) 0
i i
c q   for all i =1,2,3.3 Furthermore, for the sake of simplicity, 
we assume that it is less costly to install capacity at node 1 than at node 2 for all levels of 
capacity, that is, 
1 1 2 2




q q . The capacity costs include inter alia the 
producer’s annualized cost of providing for grid infrastructure from the production facility to 
the grid connection point (radial grids), see the discussion in section 3.1 on investment 
contributions.  
We denote by ijT  the physical power flow capacity between the two connected nodes i and  j. 
We follow the modeling of a simple transmission network in Chao and Peck (1996) and  
Bushnell and Soft (1997), and assume that there are no losses in the network, and that the only 
significant constraints are the thermal limits on each line. The grid capacity can be expanded 
                                                 
3 We use one apostrophe to denote the first derivative and two apostrophes to denote the second derivative. 
 
 
Figure 1. Electric power network 
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by investments; either in new transmission and/or distribution infrastructure or upgrading the 
existing network (see Joskow, 2005 for list of projects to enhance transmission networks):  
 0
ij ij ijT T I   , (1) 
where 0
ij
T is  the initial transmission capacity and ijI denotes new transmission capacity in line 
(ij), all measured in MW.  Although all investment projects are typically lumpy, we simplify 
the model by treating new transmission capacity as a divisible investment project, and there 
are increasing costs attached to adjusting the transmission capacities. (The lumpy 
characteristics of grid investments are taken into account in the numerical model, see section 
3.2).   
As it is less costly to increase the capacity at node 1 than at node 2, the pressure on the 
transmission capacity typically comes from the production at node 1. According to Kirchoff’s 
law, we have the following constraint for the power flow on the line between node 1 and 2:4  
 0




q q T I    (2)  
To simplify, we ignore the other physical transmission constraints within zone A by assuming 
that they will always be nonbinding, also in the absence of new investments. The cost of new 
transmission capacity between node 1 and 2 is given by 
12
( )k I , where 0k  . 
The transmission capacity between node 3 and 5 can also be expanded by investments, either 
in new transmission lines or upgrading the existing network.   
 0
3 35 35
.q T I   (3)  
                                                 
4 Electricity moves according to Kirchoff’s law, following the path of least resistance. The constraint follows 
from the symmetric structure of our network model (identical characteristics of the transmission lines).  
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The cost of building new transmission capacity in prize zone B is an increasing  function of 
the new transmission capacity between node 3 and 5, given by
35
(I )d , where 0d  .  
We assume, again for the sake of simplicity, that the flow on the high voltage transmission 
capacity between price zone A and B goes in the direction from B to A, such that the relevant 






q q q T I    ,  (4) 
where , ,Ckq k A B denote consumption in price zone k. The cost of building new transmission 
capacity between A and B is an increasing function of the new transmission capacity between 
A and B, given by ( )
AB
z I , where 0z  .  
Consumption equals production:  
 1 2 3
CA CB
q q q q q     (5) 
2.1 Socially optimal capacity localization 
The social welfare generated from electricity consumption (W) is the benefit from consuming 
electricity, expressed by the utility functions ( )
CA
A
U q and  ( )
CB
B
U q   
( 0, 0, , )
k k
U U k A B    , less of the production and transmission cost. We assume that the 
regulator wants to stimulate production of new renewable energy. The regulator’s objective 
function is to maximize social welfare, given 
R
q  units of new wind energy.  
 1 2 3
R
q q q q    (6) 
This leads to the following objective function:  
 
1 1 2 2 3 3 12 35
Max (q ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
CA CB
A B AB
W U U q c q c q c q k I d I z I            (7) 
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subject to (2)-(5). 
See Appendix A for the derivation of the first order conditions. The solution depends on 
whether the transmission constraints are binding or not. 
2.1.1 Non-binding transmission constraints 
When the transmission constraints are non-binding we find the following optimality 






A A B R
U U
c c c
c U c U c U 
 
   
           
  (8) 
where 
R
 is the shadow cost of the renewable constraint.  
Proposition 1. In the case of non-binding transmission constraints:  
• The optimal distribution of consumption is such that the marginal benefit of 
consumption is equalized across prize zones  
• The optimal distribution of renewable production capacities is such that the marginal 
cost of production capacities should be equalized across all production nodes.  
• Due to the renewable constraint, marginal cost of production exceeds the marginal 
benefit from consumption. The difference is equalized across all production zones. 
Proof: Proposition 1 follows from the first-order conditions and a binding renewable target (
0
R
  ).   
2.1.2 Binding transmission constraints 
When the transmission constraints are binding in optimum, we find the following optimality 
conditions for the distribution of production capacities and investments in transmission lines 
(see Appendix A): 




c k c k c d z
U U z
           
   
  (9) 
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This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: With binding transmission constraints: 
• The marginal cost of production capacities including the marginal cost of the 
(optimal) investments that have to be made to accommodate the new generation 
capacity, should be equalized across production nodes.   
• The marginal utility of consumption less the marginal cost of transmission between 
price zones, should be equalized across price zones. 
Proof: Proposition 2 follows from the first-order conditions (see Appendix A). 
From proposition 2, we can immediately derive the following corollary:  
Corollary 1. With binding transmission constraints: 
• The marginal cost of optimal production capacity will differ within price zones and 
across price zones.  
• The marginal utility of optimal consumption will differ across price zones.   
2.2 Profit maximizing behavior 
We now consider a system with shallow connection charges; that is, energy producers do not 
face the full transmission costs of accommodating their additional generation capacity,
12 35
( , , )
AB
I I I . Let 
A
p  and 
B
p denote energy prices in zone A and B, respectively. We assume 
that the producers and the TSO are price-takers. Furthermore let iF  denote the feed-in 
premium for renewables at production node i. The profits of the producers at node 1, node 2 
and node 3 are given by, respectively,
1 1 1 1
( ) ( )
A
p F q c q   ,
2 2 2 2
( ) ( )
A
p F q c q    and 
3 3 3 3
( ) ( )
B
p F q c q   .  











c q p F
c q p F




  (10) 
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The consumers maximize their welfare, given by ( ) , ,
i Ci i
U q p i A B  , leading to the 












  (11) 
Throughout the analysis we assume that the transmission system operator (TSO) and/or 
distribution system operators (DSOs) invest in the local grid to accommodate new generation 
capacities within each price zone, and optimize profit when it comes to investments in the 
high voltage grid between price zones.  
The TSO’s profit ( G ) from the high voltage grid is the income from selling in the high price 
zone and buying in the low price zone, less of the investment costs. The amount of trade is 
restricted by the transmission capacity, 0AB ABT I :  
 0( ) ( ) ( )G A B AB AB ABp p T I z I        (12) 
Maximizing G with respect to ABI gives the following first-order condition: 
 A Bp p z    (13) 
From (10), (11) and (13), we can write the capacities and trade between A and B as functions 
of the prices and feed-in premium. The equilibrium prices, as functions of the feed-in 
premium, are found from the market equilibrium conditions:  
 
1 1 2 2
3 3
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
A A AB A B CA A
B AB A B CB B
q p F q p F I p p q p
q p F I p p q p
     
   
  (14) 
2.2.1 Optimal feed-in premiums 
We define optimal feed-in premiums as the premiums that ensure that producers locate their 
production according to the socially optimal location. In the case of a non-binding 
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I I I   . We 
see from (10) and (11) that the following feed-in premiums gives the optimal production 
capacities identified in (8): 
 * * * * * * *
1 1 2 2 3 3
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1,2, 3
CA CA CB
i A A B R
F c q U q c q U q c q U q i               (15) 
Proposition 3: With no binding transmission constraints, the optimal feed-in premium should 
be equalized across all production nodes and set equal to the shadow cost of the renewable 
constraint (in optimum).   
For binding transmission constraints, the optimal localization is characterized by (5), (6) and 
(9). We see from (10) and (11) that the following feed-in premiums give the optimal 








( ) ( )
( ) ( )







F c q U q
F c q U q




  (16) 
Furthermore, we see from the first order conditions (Appendix A) that: 
 
** ** ** **
1 1 12
** ** ** **
2 2 12
** ** ** **
3 3 35
1
( ) ( ) ( )
3
1
( ) ( ) ( )
3







c q U q k I
c q U q k I




    
    
    
  (16) 
 
Proposition 4: With binding transmission constraints, the feed-in premiums should differ 
across production nodes. 
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We see from the right hand side of (16) that the optimal feed-in premiums can be expressed 
by shadow costs of the optimizing problem. The first term represents the shadow cost of the 
renewable constraint and is identical for all locations.  
The second term represents the transmission costs associated with increased capacity. The 
second term will in general differ across production nodes, and correspond to optimal deep 
connections charges. (See discussion in the introduction).   
The following proposition follows directly from the right hand side of (16): 
Proposition 5: Let the production nodes be ranked according to their marginal transmission 
costs associated with increased capacity. The higher transmission costs, the lower feed-in 
premiums.  
Note that the feed-in premiums should not be adjusted for the marginal transmission cost 
between zone A and B. The reason is that this transmission cost is reflected in the price 
difference between the zones, when the TSO optimizes the investment, see (13). However, 
within a price zone, the transmission cost is not properly internalized by the producers, as they 
all face the same price for their production capacity, regardless of their impact on the need for 
new grid capacities. If there is only one node within a price zone, this problem obviously 
disappears:  
Proposition 6: With optimal nodal pricing, the feed in-premiums should be equalized across 
nodes, also in the case of binding transmission constraints. 
Proof: Let 1 2,p p and 3p  denote the producer prices in the production nodes. Taking into 
account the transmission costs associated with increased production capacities, and 







A A B A B
p p k p p k p p d p p z           . Given these price differences, an 
identical feed-in premium (equal to **R ) for all profit maximizing producers will yield an 
outcome which satisfies (9). 
2.3 Optimal versus suboptimal feed-in premiums  
In the case of binding transmission constraints and socially optimal (“opt”) feed-in premiums, 
(16), the social welfare is given by    
 
** **
** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
1 1 3 2 3 3 12 1 2 35 3
(q ) ( )





W U U q
c q c q c q k I q q d I q z I q
 
       
  (17) 
Consider the case where all producers get the same feed-in premium, sufficiently large to 
fulfill the same renewable outcome as in (17), given that the TSO and/or DSOs accommodate 
new generation capacities within each price zone, and optimize profit when it comes to 
investments in the high voltage grid between price zones, see  (13). Hence, the equilibrium 
outcome satisfies (10) ,(11) and (13) for 
1 2 3
F F F  . Let the outcomes be denoted with bars. 
The social welfare of this profit maximizing (“PM”) system is   
 
1 1 3 3 3 3 12 1 2 35 3
(q ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( , )) ( ( )) ( ( , ))
PM A CA B CB
CA CB
AB
W U U q
c q c q c q k I q q d I q z I q q
 
       
  (18) 
Note that in the case of non-binding transmission constraints, opt PMW W . However, when it  
is optimal to differentiate the feed-in premiums, due to the transmission constraints, the 
location of production capacities and the investment in the grid will differ between (17) and 
(18), and opt PMW W . Identical feed-in premiums across locations will in that case lead to 
too large production capacities in nodes where the accommodating investment costs are large 
(relatively to the profit from electricity production).  
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In the next section we illustrate numerically how uniform versus non-uniform feed-in 
premiums can affect the location of new wind-power plants, grid investments and social 
welfare (measured in energy system cost of meeting an exogenous demand for energy 
services).    
2.4 Implications of the simplifying assumptions 
In order to highlight our main points, we have made several simplifying assumptions about 
the electric power network. Some of these are quite standard and reasonable characteristics of 
the economy, like increasing, and non-concave generation capacity cost and profit (utility) 
maximizing behavior. Furthermore, we have made some assumptions on transmission 
capacities, production cost differences and direction of flows (bullet point 4, 5 and 6 in Table 
2). These assumptions are merely done for the purpose of simplifications and have no impact 
on the propositions. We have assumed that transmission capacities are divisible investment 
project with continuous increasing cost functions. If we instead had presented the investment 
projects as lumpy investments options, we could not derive the first order conditions as we 
have done. It that case we had to find the investment option with cost closest to the optimality 
conditions derived in our model. This specification would, in our view, not add much to the 
illustrative purpose of our analytical model. The lumpy characteristics of grid investments are 
taken into account in the numerical model, presented in the section 3.2. We have ignored 
transmission losses. If we had taken that into account, things become more complicated as 
new production may affect the distribution of transmission losses throughout the network (see 
Chao and Peck, 1996). That issue is beyond the illustrative purpose of our analytical model. 
However, in the numerical model presented below, transmission losses are included.  
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3 Numerical illustration  
Norway has implemented EUs Renewables Directive and has, together with Sweden, a joint 
target for new renewable energy by 2020. Norway and Sweden have a joint green certificate 
market (GCM) for new renewable energy, see The Swedish Energy Agency and the 
Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (2013).  As shown in Aune et al. (2012), 
in the case of no uncertainty and market power, cf. von der Fehr and Ropenus (2017), a green 
certificate system can be designed to yield the same outcome as feed-in tariffs or feed-in 
premiums. In the following we use a numerical model to illustrate the potential social cost of 
uniform versus non-uniform feed-in premiums, given a target of 5TWh increased wind 
production. An increase of 5TWh is in line with the literature on expected new wind power 
production in Norway, given the Norwegian-Swedish renewable target. Lind and Rosenberg 
(2014) obtained a production increase of around 4.5 TWh from wind power when analyzing 
how various risk factors could influence the green certificate market of Norway and Sweden.  
In a work by Bøeng (2010), a production increase of 6 TWh from wind power is assumed 
when analyzing the consequences of the renewable energy directive. By October 2016, only 
0.4 TWh of new wind power production in Norway contributes to the joint target of 28.4 
TWh of new renewable energy production by the end 2020. However, wind-power facilities 
expected to produce approximately 3.3 TWh is currently under construction in Norway (NVE, 
2016a). In 2016, the annual Norwegian wind-power production was 2.1 TWh (Weid, 2017), 
with an installed capacity of 873 MW. This corresponded roughly to 1.4% of the total national 
power production that year. 
For both Norway and Sweden, the expected renewable production increase can lead to 
challenges for the electricity transmission grid. For several of the price areas in the Nordic 
spot market, the existing transmission grid has limited capacity for new power projects. Both 
countries have extensive plans for expanding and strengthening grids, but the relevant projects 
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will depend on various investment decisions related to renewable power technologies. 
Furthermore, the investments must be within the grid regulations.  
3.1 Grid regulations 
In Norway, the connection of new electricity generation plants to the grid must follow 
Norwegian requirements governed by the Energy Act with appurtenant regulations. Section 3-
4 of the Energy Act requires grid companies to connect to new electricity production and 
consumption units and to carry out the necessary investments in their grid. This provision was 
introduced with effect from 1 January 2010 as a tool to facilitate better coordination between 
grid, production and consumption behaviour (Ot. prp. nr. 62 (2008-2009), p. 25).5 
The connection requirement applies for all grid companies, including the TSO Statnett, and 
for all the necessary grid investments from the connection point and up to and including the 
transmission grid. It is, however, still the electricity producer’s responsibility to provide for 
grid infrastructure from the production facility to the grid connection point identified by the 
grid company (Ot. prp. nr. 62 (2008-2009), p. 34). 
The grid company may be granted an exemption from the connection and investment 
obligation if the production and grid investments taken together are not considered so-called 
“socio-economic profitable”. The assessment of socio-economic profitability will primarily be 
made by comparing the total income from both the production and grid facilities with the total 
cost from the same facilities.6  
Neither Section 3-4 of the Energy Act nor Section 3-4 of the Energy Regulation set forth any 
rules governing the distribution of costs for grid investments carried out by the grid company 
as part of the connection obligation.  Section 17-5 of the Control Regulation sets forth that the 
                                                 
5 The provision is supplemented by the Energy Regulation 7 December 1990 No. 959 Section 3-4. 
6 In cases where several production or grid facilities must be established, all facilities must be assessed together 
(Ot. prp. nr. 62 (2008-2009), pp. 3-4). The right of exemption is analysed in detail by Bjerke (2013), pp. 69-115. 
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grid companies may stipulate an investment contribution (“anleggsbidrag”) in order to cover 
investment costs for new grid connections, or cover the costs for grid reinforcements to 
existing customers where the customers require increased capacity.7 Investment contributions 
for new grid connections may, however, at the outset only be required for radial grids, as 
these grids will have a specific customer group, for example a new electricity producer. For 
meshed grids, investment contributions may only be required in extraordinary cases. 
In cases where investment contributions may be required, the grid company shall determine 
the amount irrespective of the customer’s estimated energy off take and the maximum cost 
may be set to investment cost less connection charge. The latter right to a connection charge is 
further regulated in Section 17-4 of the Control Regulation. The investment contribution shall 
be estimated based on the costs arising due to the customer’s connection to the grid. If the 
connection requires reinforcement of a joint radial grid with several users, a proportionate 
share of the cost may be comprised by the investment contribution. The grid company may 
also distribute the investment contribution between customers connected to the grid at the 
time of completion and customers that will be connected to the grid at a later stage within the 
next 10 years after completion. 
When the new grid facilities become operational, the question arises how the costs for running 
the grid shall be distributed between the grid company’s customers. If the new grid is defined 
as an ordinary grid facility, i.e. distribution or transmission grid, the grid income will fall 
under the grid company’s income frame and tariff costs will be distributed among all grid 
users. However, if the new grid has as its main function to transport electricity from the 
connected electricity production facility to the closest exchange point in the grid, it qualifies 
as a production related grid facility. The tariff costs for such production related grid facilities 
shall be covered by the electricity producer in question, and not be distributed among all grid 
                                                 
7 Regulation 11 March 1999 No. 302. 
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company customers.8  The relevant costs for new grid facilities are also included in the 
numerical illustration presented below. If the new grid’s main function is to transport 
electricity to the closest exchange point in the grid, the cost are covered by each individual 
wind power plant (i.e. power producers). Otherwise, the cost are covered by the local grid 
company, as indicated by the various transmission lines in figure 3.  
3.2 Modelling Framework 
TIMES (The Integrated MARKAL-EFOM System) is a model generator developed as a part 
of the IEA-ETSAP (Energy Technology Systems Analysis Program) (ETSAP, 2017). The 
TIMES model generator combines two different systematic approaches to energy system 
modelling, including a technical engineering approach and an economic approach. A TIMES 
model gives a detailed description of the entire energy system including all resources, energy 
production technologies, energy carriers, demand devices, and sectorial demand for energy 
services. A two-step methodology is used where the demand of energy services is calculated 
first. This is used as input to the energy system model that again calculates the energy 
consumption. The development in useful energy demand is calculated as an activity (e.g. m2) 
multiplied by an indicator (e.g. kWh/m2). The development in both the activity and the 
indicator is based on national studies. Assumptions of economic growth, business 
development, demographics etc. and development of energy indicators are considered, as well 
as normative measures (e.g. building regulations). The energy demand is divided into four 
main sectors (with underlying sub-groups); industry, households, service & other, and 
transport. For the household sector, number of persons per dwelling (ppl/dwelling), area per 
dwelling (m2/dwelling), and energy service demand per area (kWh/m2) are the main energy 
indicators. Similarly, energy service demand per area or energy service demand per capita 
                                                 
8 See Section 17-1 of the Control Regulation. See also Section 17-1 second paragraph on the distribution of costs 
in cases of other offtake directly from the production related grid facility. 
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(kWh/capita) were used for the primary, tertiary and the construction sector. Both the 
development in the activity (A), for instance floor area, and the development of the energy 
indicators (I) must be considered. 
A modified version of TIMES-Norway (Lind et al., 2013; Rosenberg and Lind, 2014) is used 
to analyze the optimal location of new wind power plants based on various transmission grid 
assumptions (see below). The potential for new onshore wind facilities in the TIMES model is 
based on information from the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE). 
NVE reports information on all wind power plants that have either applied for a license or 
been approved. In order to ensure socio-economic profitability, we have only included wind 
power plants with a license in our numerical simulations, see discussion in section 3.1.9 Based 
on the information in the licensing database (NVE, 2016b), each plants’ respective investment 
and operating costs are included, along with associated capacity factors. Investment costs also 
include the investment contribution to new radial grids (“anleggsbidrag”), as discussed in 
section 3.1. 10 As a part of the transmission network tariffs a locational charge for marginal 
losses to all users of the system is applied. This term is calculated individually for each 
separate input point and determined based on marginal network losses in the network system 
as a whole. Note that this location charge only takes into account marginal losses in the 
transportation of electricity and not the investment costs associated with expansions of the 
meshed grids.   
Geographically, the TIMES model covers Norway, Sweden and Denmark, and is divided into 
11 model regions (see Figure 2) based on the pricing areas in the Nordic spot market for 
electricity (Nord Pool Spot, 2015; Statnett, 2017). As seen in the figure below, Norway is 
divided into five market areas for electricity. This is based on the regulations of the Energy 
                                                 
9 Only projects which are considered socio-economic profitable will be granted a construction license pursuant to 
Section 3-1 of the Energy Act, see further the objectives set out in Section 1-2 of the Act. 
10 See Section 17-5 of the Control Regulation. 
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Act, where it is stated that the system operating grid companies are responsible for dividing 
the various countries into elspot areas in order to handle large and prolonged bottlenecks in 
the regional and central grid. In addition, the power and market situation of each of these 
areas will determine the direction of the power flows between the elspot areas.  
 





Transmission grid modelling 
As described in section 2, investments in new wind power production capacity may 
necessitate grid reinforcements. Indeed, several of the potential new power projects in 
Norway will require investments in the transmission grid. In order to incorporate this feature 
in the TIMES model, integer variables are included to describe whether or not a grid 
investment is made. As indicated in Figure 3, several wind power projects can use the same 
transmission line if built, whereas none of the projects can be completed if the opposite 
happens. If e.g. transmission line A is constructed in a social optimal scenario, it is most 
likely that the majority of the wind power projects connected to this line will be built before 
another transmission line is constructed. The same applies to transmission line B and C. 
Additionally, some projects are not in need of a new transmission line, and can be connected 





Figure 3: Intersection between wind power and transmission grid projects 
Energy End Use Demand 
The demand for various energy services are supplied exogenously to the model. The TIMES 
model is used to analyse the consumption of energy carriers and to investigate the substitution 
effect with technology shifts. In this work, the same methodology as in Rosenberg et al. 
(2013) is used for calculating the energy end use demand, where the calculations are based on 
the development of drivers and indicators of each demand sector. More specific details 
regarding the demand projection can be found in Rosenberg et al. (2015). It should be noted 
that flexible demand could be an economical and technical alternative in preference to grid 
investments. However, this work focuses solely on optimal location of renewable power, and 
any measures on the supply side of the energy system is not covered here.   
3.3 Scenario Assumptions 
Unless otherwise noted, the analyses in this paper take account of all active national policy 
measures with direct relevance to the electricity market. However, instead of the joint green 
certificate market with Sweden, we consider a domestic feed-in premium scheme for new 
renewables.  The energy taxes are kept constant at the 2014 level until 2050, including value 
added tax (VAT), nonrecurring charge for new vehicles, fuel tax for road transport, tax on 
electricity consumption, and various CO2 taxes.  
Energy Prices 
Energy prices for imported energy carriers are taken from Energinet.dk (2015). The prices of 
electricity import/export to and from Scandinavia are given exogenously and kept constant at 
the 2014 level throughout the analyses. In addition, the various price profiles for each of the 
time-slices are calculated based on historical prices. It should be noted that electricity prices 
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in the Scandinavian regions are endogenous, represented by the dual values of the electricity 
balance equation.  
Scenarios 
Socially optimal scenario (opt): As a starting point, we added a restriction to the TIMES 
model requiring 5 TWh of new wind power production in Norway by 2020. As discussed 
above, this assumption is motivated by a likely production increase in Norway due to the 
green certificate market. For the opt scenario, we find the welfare optimizing combination of 
locations of new capacities and grid investments by minimizing energy system cost, including 
the costs of necessary investments in the transmission grid. The outcome of this scenario 
corresponds to (17) in the analytical model.  
Profit max scenario (PM): The same restriction regarding production increase is added in this 
case as well. In the PM scenario, the wind power producers act as if they received a uniform 
feed-in premium, sufficiently high to incentivize 5 TWh of new wind power. The producers 
find the locations for their wind farms that maximize their profit, given that the TSO invests 
in grids to accommodate their capacity into the energy system, as described in 2.2. 
Technically this is modeled in TIMES by first finding the least cost locations of wind farms, 
ignoring the costs of necessary transmission upgrades within each price zone. Thereafter, we 
find the necessary investments in transmission grids within each price zones to accommodate 
the new capacities. Upgrades of the high-voltage inter zones transmission lines are assumed to 
be implemented if profitable, given the new capacities and zonal transmission grids.  The 
welfare of this scenario corresponds to (20) in the analytical model.   
For all of the scenarios, TIMES finds the total cost of providing the electricity demanded. We 
compare the system cost of the Profit max scenario with the system cost of the socially 
optimal scenario, where the difference is the social cost of an inefficient geographical 
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distribution of wind parks. Additionally, we identify the cost of transmission network 
investments for each location. 
We also present a Business as usual scenario (bau). The purpose of this scenario is to 
demonstrate the effects of the policies analyzed in the other scenarios. 
Sensitivity analyses of the three main scenarios were also conducted. Here, Kirchhoff’s laws 
are incorporated by including a DC power flow linearization of an AC power flow, as well as 
simplified N-1 security constraints. Clearly, the actual grid is much more detailed than the 
aggregated network included in the TIMES model. It is therefore too strict to assume that the 
grid behaves as according to Kirchhoff’s voltage law. However, it is also imprecise to assume 
that the law does not apply. Results from the sensitivity analysis are presented in the 
appendix.  
3.4 Results 
Figure 4 illustrates the new wind power production in 2020 for the three main scenarios. As 
shown, the model results vary considerably for three of the price areas depending on how the 
transmission grid investment costs are included. For the Profit max scenario, it is optimal that 
the production increase is largest in NO3. Currently, this region is a net importer of energy, so 
increasing the local production will decrease the dependency of imports from other regions. 
The production increase is second largest in NO2, which is the southernmost price area in 
Norway. This area is strongly connected to Europe through cables. There is also a 
considerable production increase in the northernmost price area (NO4). This is largely due to 
the high capacity factors (i.e. better wind conditions) experienced in this area.  
The Socially optimal scenario illustrates the optimal location of new wind farms when all 
necessary investments related to grid expansion are taken into consideration. Compared to 
PM, the production increase is now even larger in NO3. This is mainly due to the fact that the 
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PM scenario will not be optimal when adding the costs of network development. It will 
require significant grid investments to export the additional electricity out of NO4, which 
means that it is more cost effective to take both power and grid investments in NO3. As a 
consequence, the production increase is now lowest in NO4.  
 
 
Figure 4: New wind power production in 2020 
 
Figure 5 illustrates total power production costs for the new wind farms and the total costs 
related to the grid expansion (related to both transmission and distribution). The grid costs are 
around 55 % higher for the Profit max scenario, primarily due to higher necessary investments 
















power production costs are roughly 8% lower. In total, achieving the target of 5 TWh of new 
wind power is only 6% more costly under a system with uniform feed-in premiums (Profit 
max) than under a system with optimal localization of new wind farms (as would follow from 
optimally differentiated feed-in-premiums, the Social optimal scenario). 11 Hence, policies to 
minimize the system costs of new wind power have significant impact on the geographical 
distribution of wind farms, but significantly less impact on the total energy system cost.  
 
Figure 5: Power and transmission grid costs 
                                                 
11 Note that we have limited the analysis to include only those wind power plants with a license. In a model-run 
where we expanded the feasible region by also including wind power projects that have applied for a license, the 


















Figure 6 illustrates the investment costs for transmission grid upgrades per region for the two 
main scenarios. As seen, the investments vary considerably for NO4 depending on the wind 
power production in this region. A positive change in production of 0.7 TWh in NO3 (going 
from PM to opt) gives an increased transmission cost of around 200 MNOK, whereas a 
decreased production of 0.8 TWh in NO4 results in cost savings of around 2 400 MNOK for 
this model region. Otherwise, the necessary grid investments do not vary significantly for the 
other three model regions. It is interesting to note that the grid investment costs are almost 
similar for the Social optimal and the Profit max scenarios for region NO3, although there is a 
difference in power production of around 0.7 TWh.  This clearly demonstrates that the same 
grid connection(s) can be used for several wind power projects, just as described in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 6: Investment costs per region  
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3.5 Other case studies 
The text below describes briefly seven other papers dealing with adjacent problems, however 
none of them consider long-term investments in both grids and generation capacity 
simultaneously. Delarue and D’haeseleer (2007) analysed expansion of the net transfer 
capacity (NTC) on Belgian-French and Belgian-German borders. A simulation tool called E-
Simulate was used to simulate electricity generation in a set of interconnected zones. It is an 
8-zone model, where each zone represents a country. Here, each zone has its own set of 
electricity generation technologies. The main conclusion is that when imposing expansion on 
the NTC, the optimal distribution of power generation changes.  
Schroeder et al. (2013) analysed electricity capacity investments in 2030 for Germany. The 
analysed scenarios varied in the location of power resources and line expansion projects. 
However, all this information was supplied exogenously. The results indicated that the 
proposed grid expansions were not sufficient to avoid high line congestion, and therefore not 
able to fully integrate the amount of renewable energy.  
Steinke et al. (2013) focused on the interplay between storage and grid expansion. They 
analysed a 100% renewable power system based on wind and solar power (supplied 
exogenously) on the European level. However, there were no continuous development from 
today’s situation. In a work by Lumbreras et al. (2017), optimal transmission expansion 
planning in a stochastic optimization context were presented. The model determines new 
investments in lines, transformers and circuits in a medium and long-term perspective. 
Generation expansion are handled in scenarios (exogenously). The study focused on Portugal, 
Spain and France, with a simplified grid for the rest of Europe (one node per country). 
Gils et al. (2017) assessed capacity expansion and dispatch at various levels of photovoltaic 
and wind power penetration. A linear cost minimizing energy system model (REMix) was 
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used to optimize capacity expansion of power generation, storage and transmission. The time 
horizon is one year, whereas the model divides Europe into 15 model regions. The results 
from the scenarios indicated that transmission expansion becomes important at high wind 
shares. Schlachtberger et al. (2017) analysed how to balance large shares of wind and solar 
PV at continental level with transmission grids and locally with storage. They performed a 
techno-economic cost optimization for the capacity investments and dispatch of wind and 
other generation technologies. The load and generation were aggregated at the country level. 
The model used has limited spatial detail, one-year horizon and focuses only on the power 
sector.  
Hess et al. (2017) focused on node-internal grid calculation representing the electricity grid in 
cost values. The study used 491 nodes for describing Germany, and analysed a 100% 
renewable energy system in 2050 with maximum grid expansion with the optimisation model 
REMix. However, the optimization of generation technologies and grid expansions are 
performed sequentially.  
4 Conclusions and discussion 
Increased renewable energy production requires new investments in the grid. However, the 
magnitude of the necessary investments depends, inter alia, on where the new production 
plants are located. In this paper we have analyzed how a subsidy scheme (feed-in premiums) 
can be designed to induce a socially optimal location of new wind power capacities, given the 
subsequent investments in grids to accommodate the new capacities to the energy system. The 
optimal non-uniform feed-in premiums are differentiated across locations. The optimal feed-
in premiums correspond to a system with optimal connection charges combined with a 
uniform subsidy to wind power.  Hence, implementing a system with differentiated feed-in 
premiums faces some of the same challenges as implementing a system with geographically 
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differentiated deep connection charges. A large increase in renewables, and thereby grid 
investments, calls for an investigation of the current regulations to see whether it might be 
reasonable to allow for some kind of differentiated feed-in premiums or connection charges 
which reflects the grid investments costs. Such solutions must be assessed further under 
EU/EEA law, in particular State aid law, as well as from the perspective of regulatory design, 
where the question arises how such scheme may be drafted with sufficient precision. 
Our numerical illustration indicates that for an increase in new wind power of 5 TWh, the 
total cost of an uncoordinated location (the Profit max) was modestly (5%) higher than a 
coordinated development (social optimum). However, the location of new capacities and 
thereby grid investments differed substantially.  The Profit max scenario demanded 55% more 
grid investments. In this paper we have not considered any of the environmental costs 
associated with wind parks and new grids. Including environmental cost may lead to another 
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Appendix A 
In this appendix we find the first order conditions for the optimizing problem given by  
(7) and (2)-(5). 
We solve the optimizing problem by first forming the Lagrangian:  
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where R  is the shadow cost of the renewable constraint, TA is the shadow cost of the 
transmission constraint within price zone A, 
M
 is the shadow cost of the market equilibrium 
constraint, TAB is the shadow cost of the transmission constraint between prize zone A and B 
and TB  
is the shadow cost of the transmission constraint in price zone B.  
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solution to (18) when the transmission constraints are non-binding. 
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solution to (18) when the transmission constraints are binding. 
 
Appendix B 
This section presents some of the results from the sensitivity analysis described in section 3.3. 
Figure 7 illustrates the new wind power production per region in 2020 for the opt and PM 
scenarios, respectively. The results are presented with and without the Kirchhoff’s voltage 
law imposed on the grid. Generally, when the voltage law is imposed, the geographical 
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location in the grid becomes more important. This can to some extent be seen in figure 7. It is 
now harder to transmit electricity from the two northernmost regions (NO3 and NO4). 
Instead, more projects are developed in NO2, which is highly connected to Europe.  
 
Figure 7: New wind power production in 2020  
As seen in figure 8, much of the production increase is exported from Norway. Export 
volumes are also increased when the Kirchhoff’s voltage law is imposed on the grid. The 
reason is that the grid becomes less flexible and network capacities are therefore more 
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